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far in excess of the policy limits might be
entered against Campbell; and State Farm
did not warn the Campbells that they
would be jointly and severally liable for the
entire judgment even if Campbell were
found only partially at fault. Rather, State
Farm falsely assured the Campbells there
was no evidence against Campbell and no
danger of exposure beyond their policy limits. Moreover, the Campbells allege that
State Farm affirmatively acted to deceive
them by destroying Summers' candid report of his evaluation of the case against
Campbell. Finally, after the trial, State
Farm completely disclaimed any responsibility for the excess judgment, instead,
through counsel, advising its aged, retired
insureds to put a "for sale" sign on their
farm.

result, they suffered damages, including
emotional distress, proximately caused by
State Farm's alleged breach, and to prove
they are entitled to punitive damages.24
Accordingly, while State Farm's subsequent payment of the excess judgment may
have served to mitigate the damages flowing from its alleged bad faith conduct, it
does not nullify the Campbells' bad faith
cause of action.25
II. AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
CAMPBELLS, THE OSPITALS,
AND SLUSHER

Viewing these disputed facts in the light
most favorable to the Campbells, as we
must, we think that a jury could reasonably
conclude that State Farm violated the implied duty of good faith it owed to the
Campbells. Thus, the Campbells are entitled to an opportunity to prove that State
Farm acted in bad faith and that, as a

[10] State Farm also argues the Campbells' bad faith claim should be barred by
the agreement the Campbells made with
the Ospitals and Slusher.28 We disagree.
Like State Farm's eventual payment of the
excess judgment, the agreement irisulating
the Campbells from liability for payment of
the judgment does not cure the alleged bad
faith conduct of State Farm. However, the
agreement is certainly relevant to the
Campbells' damages.
Insofar as this
agreement served to ease the Campbells'
minds, it may have lessened the extent of
their claimed emotional distress. However,
a fair amount of time passed between the
entry of the excess judgment against
Campbell and finalization of the agreement, during which time the Campbells
may have continued to suffer emotional
upset. Thus, the Campbells assert that the
agreement's effect on their claimed emotional distress is an issue for the factfinder
to weigh. Like State Farm's eventual payment of the judgment, the existence of this
agreement does not necessarily vitiate the
Campbells' cause of action.

24. Of course we hold only that the Campbells
are entitled to an opportunity to prove they are
entitled to such damages; we do not hold they
have done so. Punitive damages require conduct that is willful and malicious, or manifesting a knowing and reckless indifference and
disregard toward the rights of others. See, e.g.,
Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah
1988).

beyond the amount of the excess judgment itself. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Distributing Risk
192 (1986). Be that as it may, that fact does not
undermine our decision that, as a matter of law,
an insured may state a bad faith claim though
the insurer has paid the excess judgment. We
leave the difficulties of proof relating to the
insurer's conduct and the insured's damages to
the Campbells and the trier of fact.

State Farm points out that Mr. Campbell
allegedly insisted he was not to blame for
the accident and that this at least partially
explains State Farm's decision to go to
trial. The insured's demand (or lack thereof) that the case be settled certainly is
relevant to a determination whether the
insurer wrongfully refused to settle. However, Mr. Campbell alleges that he was not
properly apprised of the strength of the
case against him and the likelihood of a
large excess judgment being entered
against him. These are material issues of
fact which must be resolved by the trier of
fact upon remand.

25. One author discussing damages for bad faith
failure to settle a third-party claim notes that in
very few cases have insureds recovered damages

26. See supra note 8.
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ill.

THE CAMPBELLS' OTHER
CAUSES OF ACTION

Boyd J. BROWN, an individual, and Interwest Aviation Corporation, Plaintiffs, Counter-Defendants, Appellees,
and Cross-Appellants,

[111 In addition to the Campbells' claim
that State Farm breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, they
claim State Farm's conduct also gave rise
to other causes of action, including breach David K. RICHARDS, an individual, and
David K. Richards & Company, Defenof fiduciary duty, fraudulent misrepresendants, Counter-Plaintiffs, Appellants,
tation, and intentional infliction of emotionand Cross-Appellees.
al distress. As State Farm has pointed
out, all of the Campbells' claims are deNo. 900639-CA.
rived from the same conduct: State Farm's
Court
of Appeals of Utah.
failure to settle the case within the policy
limits. Because we have concluded that
Aug. 24, 1992.
the actionable wrong is the failure to settle, not the failure to pay the resulting
Seller brought action against buyer to
judgment and, thus, that the Campbells
have a cause of action for breach of the enforce purchase agreement, and buyer
covenant of good faith, the Campbells are brought counterclaim against seller for
entitled to an opportunity to pursue their fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach
other causes of action stemming from the of warranty, and breach of fiduciary duty.
The District Court, Salt Lake County, Kensame allegedly wrongful conduct.27
neth Rigtrup, J., entered judgment for both
seller on contract claim and buyer on other
CONCLUSION
claims, and buyer appealed, and seller
The Campbells are entitled to pursue a
cross-appealed. The Court of Appeals,
cause of action against State Farm for Bench, P.J., held that: (1) parol evidence
breach of the covenant of good faith and was inadmissible to establish that buyer
fair dealing, based on State Farm's alleged- agreed to increased purchase price of corly unreasonable refusal to settle the case poration if it did not exercise option to
against them within policy limits, notwith- purchase building; (2) buyer relied on sellstanding the fact that State Farm paid the er's fraudulent statements, even though he
resulting excess judgment years later, af- may have discovered truth about misrepreter its affirmance on appeal. The Camp- sentations before exercising options; (3)
bells are likewise entitled to an opportunity buyer was not entitled to collect fraud
to pursue their additional claims arising award and retain ownership of corporation
from the same allegedly wrongful conduct. without making further payments under
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for executory contract; (4) seller was only entitrial or other appropriate proceedings con- tled to interest on purchase price adjusted
sistent with this opinion.
for fraud damages, not full purchase price;
(5) trial court improperly denied breach of
BENCH and GREENWOOD, JJ., concur. warranty damages; (6) seller breached fiduciary duty to buyer when they were
jointly operating corporation and buyer
KWUM>
was damaged; (7) both buyer and seller
were entitled to attorney fees as prevailing
parties in disputes concerning different
contracts; (8) buyer was prevailing party,
27. We decline to address State Farm's argument
that Mrs. Campbell lacks standing to pursue
these claims, finding it to be without merit.
Furthermore, in view of our resolution of the

primary issue in this case, the Campbells' argument that they needed additional time for discovery need not be addressed.
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though he received only portion of damages he was seeking; and (9) trial court
improperly awarded attorney fees without
adequately setting forth its analysis for
award.
Reversed and remanded in part and
affirmed in part.
1. Corporations <5='116
Parties did not agree to increase purchase price of corporation if buyer did not
exercise option to purchase property,
where final version of contract did not contain provision to increase purchase price,
and contract contained integration clause
that agreement and exhibits constituted entire agreement between parties.
2. Evidence <s=»384
Parol evidence may not be used to vary
express terms of agreement.
3. Fraud e=>23
Buyer reasonably relied upon seller's
misrepresentations, though buyer exercised
his options to purchase remainder of corporation and property after he had access to
true financial condition of corporation as
co-owner; it may have been reasonable for
buyer to protect his initial investments by
exercising options, even if he had discovered truth about misrepresentations before
exercising them.
4. Appeal and Error <3=>999(1)
Jury verdicts are entitled to great deference on appeal.
5. Appeal and Error <S=>930(1), 1001(1)
The Court of Appeals reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party, and will affirm, unless in
so doing, court must say as a matter of law
that the evidence fails to meet the test of
being clear and convincing.
6. Fraud e=»61
Willful misrepresentations by seller in
stock purchase agreement warranted punitive damages.
7. Corporations <s=118
Purchaser's substantial performance
defense against seller's breach of contract

claim did not bar seller from recovering
under stock purchase agreement, though
seller could not have enforced contract
against buyer; buyer chose to enforce rather than rescind contract, so as to retain
ownership of stock, entitling seller to recover under contract after adjustment for
his lack of performance.
8. Corporations <s=»121(7)
Defrauded buyer who chose to retain
stock and enforce stock purchase agreement was required to offset his award
against original purchase price, and was
not entitled to collect award and retain
ownership without making any further payments under agreement.
9. Damages <s=117
"Benefit of the bargain" damages are
refund to purchaser of overpayment in order to bring effective purchase price in line
with actual value received.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
10. Fraud <s=»59(2)
Where contract is executory and purchase price has yet to be paid in full, cash
award for fraud damages and forgiveness
of any outstanding debt on contract violates goal oi benefit of bargain rule.
11. Sales <s=189
If defrauded buyer has not paid
amount sufficient to satisfy adjusted purchase price of contract and chooses to enforce rather than rescind contract, buyer
must satisfy unpaid portion in order to
retain ownership of assets purchased under
contract.

12. Interest «=>56
Seller who defrauded purchaser was
only entitled to interest on adjusted purchase price under stock purchase agreement after fraud damages were offset
from purchase price, rather than interest
on full purchase price.
13. Damages <£=>\5
Trial court improperly ruled that
breach of warranty damages for buyer under purchase agreement were duplicative
of fraud damages, where seller warranted

that assets of corporation were in good and
serviceable condition, corporation's field
farm was in serious disrepair, and costs of
repairs were not included as damages under fraud claim.
14. Damages ®=104, 119
Jury is allowed wide discretion in
awarding damages.
15. Damages <s=>128
Courts must defer to jury's determination of damages unless jury disregarded
competent evidence, award is so excessive
beyond rational justification as to indicate
effect of improper factors in determination,
and award was rendered under misunderstanding.
16. Corporations <S=*310(1)
Trial court properly awarded damages
to buyer for seller's breach of fiduciary
duty during period when seller and buyer
were jointly operating corporation, where
seller borrowed against line of credit for
operational costs in breach of agreement
that line of credit would only be used for
purchasing airplanes for resale, and buyer
signed personal guaranty on line of credit;
buyer was damaged by use of line of credit
for operational expenses when he became
legally obligated to satisfy debt he did not
wish to incur.
17. Costs <$=>194.36
Trial court properly awarded attorney
fees to buyer as prevailing party in dispute
concerning agreement to purchase corporation and to seller as prevailing party in
dispute concerning agreement to purchase
building, though seller received net judgment greater than that received by buyer
for entire transaction, where agreements
were independent and intended to be enforced separately.
18. Costs <S=>194.32
The prevailing party on a given contract may recover fees without consideration of other claims in the same case arising from other contracts between the parties.
19. Costs «=»194.32
Even if contracts were merged into
one, both parties are entitled to fees when

both parties are successful in enforcing
different provisions of contract against the
other.
20. Costs «= 194.36
Buyer was properly awarded attorney
fees as prevailing party in suit relating to
purchase agreement, though buyer did not
obtain full amount of damages he was
seeking.
21. Costs <s=>194.14
It is the determination of culpability,
not amount of damages, that determines
who is prevailing party for award of attorney fees.
22. Costs <£=>194.14
While reduction in amount claimed by
plaintiff may seem moral and financial victory for defendant, it does not make defendant the prevailing party in terms of attorney fees.
23. Costs <s=194.36
Seller was entitled to award of attorney fees for successfully defending contractual rights on contracts unrelated to
sale of corporate assets, even if such efforts were not significant portion of overall
lawsuit.
24. Costs <s=»208
Trial court abuses discretion in awarding attorney fees to prevailing party in
contract action without adequately setting
forth its analysis for award in manner permitting appellate review.
25. Appeal and Error <S=984(5)
Costs <S=194.12
The calculation of attorney fees is in
sound discretion of the trial court and will
not be overturned absent showing of clear
abuse of discretion.
26. Costs <s=208
When party is contractually entitled to
attorney fees, trial court's findings regarding those fees should be just as complete
as its findings regarding other types of
contractual damages.
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27. Costs <3=>252
When party who received attorney
fees below prevails on appeal, party is also
entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal.
Robert S. Campbell, Jr. (argued), Kevin
Egan Anderson, Joann Shields, Campbell,
Maack & Sessions, Elizabeth T. Dunning,
Carolyn Cox, Watkiss, Dunning & Watkiss,
Salt Lake City, for appellants.
Bruce E. Coke (argued), Larry A. Kirkham, Curtis C. Nesset, Nygaard, Coke &
Vincent, Salt Lake City, for appellees.
Before BENCH, P.J., and BILLINGS and
GARFF, JJ.
OPINION
BENCH, Presiding Judge:
Appellants, David K. Richards and David
K. Richards & Company, (collectively
"Richards"), appeal the trial court's judgment based upon special jury interrogatories regarding a commercial transaction entered into between Richards and appellees,
Boyd J. Brown and Interwest Aviation Corporation, (collectively "Brown"). Brown
cross-appeals. We affirm in part, and reverse and remand in p a r t
BACKGROUND
Facts
This case arises out of a complex transaction where Brown, the principal shareholder of Interwest Aviation Corporation
(Interwest), sold his Interwest stock and
several other assets to Richards through
numerous agreements and options. We
summarize the facts to include only those
directly pertinent to our analysis.

owned personally by Brown (the Interwest
Building). Brown also owned a neighboring hangar, known as the Executive Air
Services Building (Executive Air Building).
In simple terms, the parties agreed that
Richards would buy fifty percent of
Brown's stock in Interwest for $450,000;
Richards would then have the option after
one year to buy the remainder of the stock
for an additional $450,000 (collectively "the
Interwest purchase agreement"). Richards
also purchased sixty percent of Brown's
ownership of the Interwest Building with
an option to purchase the remaining interest after one year (collectively "the Interwest Building agreement"). Richards was
also given an option to purchase the Executive Air Building.
The parties formally memorialized their
agreements in writing as of April 23, 1984.
Richards eventually exercised his options
to purchase Brown's remaining interests in
Interwest and the Interwest Building, but
he did not exercise the option on the Executive Air Building.
Richards made principal and interest payments from April, 1984 to April, 1986.
During that time, Brown and Richards
jointly managed Interwest. Richards then
defaulted. Brown sued Richards for his
failure to make the payments owing on the
Interwest purchase agreement and the Interwest Building agreement. Brown also
claimed, notwithstanding the written Interwest purchase agreement, that the purchase price of the corporation was to increase by $500,000 if Richards failed to
exercise the option to buy the Executive
Air Building. Richards counterclaimed for
fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach
of warranty, and breach of fiduciary duty. 1
The matter was submitted to a jury on
special interrogatories at the close of an
eight-week trial.

Interwest was a fixed-based operation
located on the east side of the Salt Lake
International Airport. In addition to providing services such as maintenance, refueling, and de-icing, Interwest bought and
sold aircraft and operated a charter service. Interwest was located in a building

Jury Verdict
In response to the special interrogatories, the jury found that Brown did not
substantially perform the agreement to sell

1. Richards had sought rescission as an alternative remedy, but opted to seek damages follow-

ing Brown's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of election of remedies.

Interwest. It further found that Brown
had defrauded Richards with regard to the
sale of Interwest. With respect to the
question of damages, the jury found that
the difference between the value of Interwest, as misrepresented by Brown, and its
true value, as received by Richards, was
$500,000. The jury also awarded Richards
$550,000 in punitive damages.
In addition to its finding of fraud, the
jury found that Brown had breached warranties in the sale of Interwest and awarded Richards another $100,000 damages.
Finally, the jury found that Brown breached fiduciary duties owed to Richards during the period of their joint ownership of
Interwest and awarded Richards an additional $300,000 in damages.
Regarding the Interwest Building agreement, the jury found that Brown had substantially performed the agreement to sell
the Interwest Building and did not misrepresent the value of the building. Pursuant to the special interrogatory, the jury
found that Richards breached the Interwest Building agreement and awarded
Brown $407,259 in damages.
The question was also put to the jury
whether Richards had agreed to pay an
additional $500,000 for Interwest if he did
not exercise the option on the Executive
Air Building. The jury found that Richards had agreed to such an increase in
price. The jury found, however, that despite Richards's failure to exercise the Executive Air Building option, Richards did
not breach the agreement to increase the
purchase price and did not award Brown
any damages.
Trial Court's Judgment
Richards submitted a proposed judgment
based upon the jury's answers to the special interrogatories, and Brown objected.
Several hearings were held due to objections raised by Brown until the trial court
finally entered final judgment on the special interrogatories and its own supplemental findings.
Despite the jury's finding that Brown did
not substantially perform the Interwest
purchase agreement, the trial court award-

ed Brown the contract amount plus interest
just as if he had prevailed on his claim
against Richards. The trial court also
awarded Brown $500,000 plus interest on
his claim that the purchase price of Interwest was to increase if Richards did not
exercise his option on the Executive Air
Building.
The trial court then awarded Richards
$500,000 plus interest on his fraud claim as
the difference between the value of Interwest as represented by Brown and the
value of the assets Richards received.
Richards was also awarded the $550,000
found by the jury as punitive damages.
As to Richards's breach of warranty
claim, the trial court ruled that the damages found by the jury were duplicative of
the damages it found on the fraud claim.
It therefore refused to award Richards
$100,000 as found by the jury to be his
damages from Brown's breach of warranty. It did, however, award Richards the
full $300,000 found by the jury to have
been the damages resulting from Brown's
breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court
did not disturb the jury's findings regarding Brown's damages resulting from Richards's breach of the Interwest Building
agreement.
Finally, the trial court awarded attorney
fees to both parties according to the contract upon which they prevailed: $435,000
to Richards pursuant to the Interwest purchase agreement, and $250,000 to Brown
pursuant to the Interwest Building agreement.
We will identify the parties' alleged errors as we consider them. The parties
raise fifteen separate issues with many
sub-issues and alternative arguments. We
have fully reviewed, but do not address,
every issue and argument raised by the
parties. The unaddressed claims and arguments are either mooted by our analysis, or
we simply decline to address them. See
State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888-889
(Utah 1989) (appellate court has discretion
as to the extent of its opinion).
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PURCHASE PRICE
[1,2] Richards asserts that the trial
court erred in denying him a directed verdict regarding Brown's claim that Richards
agreed to an increased purchase price of
Interwest if Richards did not exercise the
Executive Air Building option. Brown
claimed a draft of the contract provided
that the purchase price of Interwest would
increase, but that the provision was absent
from the final version. Richards asserts as
a matter of law that such parol evidence
may not be utilized to vary the express
terms of the agreement. We agree.
Absent fraud or other invalidating
clauses, the integrity of a written contract is maintained by not admitting parol evidence to vary or contradict the
terms of the writing once it is determined to be an integration. It is also
maintained by applying a rebuttable presumption that a writing which on its face
appears to be an integrated agreement is
what it appears to be.
Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665
(Utah 1985) (footnote omitted).
The Interwest purchase agreement specifically set forth the purchase price and
contained the following integration clause:
"This Agreement and the exhibits hereto
constitute the entire agreement between
the parties with respect to the matters
covered herein
" Brown's self-serving
assertion that the contract was not integrated because it did not contain a provision he recalled from an earlier draft is
insufficient as a matter of law to show the
contract was not integrated.
[A] party may not establish a different
contract on facts known at the time of
reducing their understanding to written
form. All preliminary negotiations, conversations, and verbal agreements are
merged in and superseded by the subsequent written contract, and unless fraud,
accident or mistake be averred, the writing constitutes the agreement between
the parties and its terms cannot be altered by parol evidence.
Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602, 607 (Utah
1974).

There being no admissible parol evidence
that the purchase price was not fully integrated into the contract, Brown failed as a
matter of law to rebut the presumption
that the contract was integrated. Richards
was therefore entitled to a directed verdict
on Brown's claim that there was an agreement to increase the purchase price. Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 57
(Utah 1991) ("a directed verdict is appropriate if, on uncontested facts and under the
applicable law, one party is entitled to judgment").
Since Richards was entitled to a directed
verdict, the question should not have been
submitted to the jury and the trial court
subsequently erred in awarding Brown
$500,000 in its final judgment. The contract purchase price was $900,000, as expressly agreed to by the parties in writing.
We therefore vacate the trial court's award
of $500,000 to Brown for the purported
increase in the contract purchase price of
Interwest.
FRAUD
Sufficiency of the Evidence
[3-5] Brown claims there was insufficient evidence of the elements of fraud and
reliance by Richards to support the jury's
verdict. Jury verdicts are entitled to great
deference. We review the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prevailing party, and will affirm "unless in so doing we
must say as a matter of law that the evidence fails to meet the test of being clear
and convincing
" Pace v. Parrish, Y12.
Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273, 274 (1952). In
order to challenge the jury's verdict, Brown
"must set out in [his] brief[], with record
references, all the evidence that supports
the verdict, including all valid inferences to
that effect, and demonstrate that reasonable people would not conclude that the
evidence supports the verdict." Hodges v.
Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d .151, 156
(Utah 1991).
Richards alleged in his complaint that
Brown made seventeen misrepresentations
about Interwest. Brown claims that as a
matter of law Richards could not have reasonably relied upon Brown's misrepresenta-
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tions when he exercised his options to purchase the remainder of Interwest and the
Interwest Building after he had access to
the true financial condition of Interwest as
a co-owner. A similar argument was made
and rejected in Pace, where a buyer chose
to enforce a real estate contract after discovering the seller's fraud. The supreme
court held that a defrauded party to an
executory contract may "affirm the contract and perform it without forfeiting his
right to maintain an action to recover damages resulting from the deceit." Pace, 247
P.2d at 277 (quoting 5 Williston on Contracts, Rev. ed., § 1524, p. 4267). See also
Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1247 (Utah
1980) (a defrauded party, "who does not
discover the fraud until he has partly performed, may go forward with the contract,
keep what he has received, and still maintain his action for damages"). Inasmuch
as Richards had invested a significant
amount in purchasing his partial shares, it
may have been reasonable for him to protect his initial investments by exercising
the options, even if he had discovered the
truth about the misrepresentations before
exercising the options. A finding of reasonable reliance is therefore not precluded
as a matter of law.
While Brown does raise questions about
some of the representations, and whether
Richards reasonably relied on some of the
statements, he has not marshaled the evidence in support of the jury verdict and
shown why the jury could not have found
fraud. He only cites the evidence favorable to his claims and reargues the evidence as if at trial.2 Such an approach is
inappropriate on appeal. Hodges, 811 P.2d
at 156. Since Brown has failed to marshal
the evidence and show how the jury could
not have reasonably found fraud, we do not
disturb the jury's finding.
2. In replying to Richards's claim that Brown has
failed to properly marshal the evidence, Brown
makes the disingenuous argument that he need
not marshal the evidence in support of the jury's
verdict because it was so "light." He then asserts that the length restrictions on his brief
prevented him from marshaling this "light"
amount of evidence.

Evidentiary Errors
[61 Brown also challenges the jury's
verdict based upon alleged evidentiary errors made by the trial court. As the supreme court has noted, "in any lawsuit of
several days duration counsel can usually
find matters upon which he may claim error, but this court will not reverse on mere
error but only if it is substantial and prejudicial to the extent that there is a reasonable likelihood that unfairness or injustice
has resulted." Lamb, 525 P.2d at 610.
Even assuming that the trial court committed the errors Brown claims, Brown has
failed to show how the errors prejudiced
the outcome of his case. Brown asserts
only that the awarding of punitive damages
evidences prejudice because, except for the
evidence erroneously admitted, there was
no conduct egregious enough to warrant
punitive damages. Given the untainted evidence of the willful misrepresentations
made by Brown, we disagree. We therefore do not disturb the judgment.
Offset of Fraud Damages Against
Purchase Price
[7] On Brown's claims that Richards
breached the Interwest purchase agreement, the trial court awarded Brown the
full purchase price of Interwest as if he
had prevailed against Richards. Richards
argues that the trial court erred in awarding Brown the full contract purchase price
because Brown was barred from recovering anything under the Interwest purchase
agreement. While the trial court erred in
portraying its final judgment as an
"award" to Brown of the full purchase
price, with an offsetting "award" to Richards, Richards's argument that Brown was
barred from receiving any amount under
the Interwest purchase agreement fails.
Richards had asserted an equitable "substantial performance" defense against
Brown's breach of contract claim.3 The
3. The substantial performance defense has been
explained as follows: "As a rule, a party first
guilty of a substantial or material breach of
contract cannot complain if the other party
thereafter refuses to perform. He can neither
insist on performance by the other party nor
maintain an action against the other party for a
subsequent failure to perform." Fernandez v.
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jury found that Brown did not substantially
perform the Interwest purchase agreement
when it responded "no" to the following
special interrogatory: "As the term is defined in the court's instructions, [has
Brown] substantially performed his agreement to sell the assets of Interwest?" According to Richards, the jury's negative
response, in light of the substantial performance instruction, evidences an intent that
Brown not recover anything under the contract. 4 Richards therefore claims the trial
court impermissibly substituted its judgment for that of the jury by allowing
Brown to recover under the contract. See
generally, First Security Bank of Utah v.
Ezra C. Lundahl, Inc., 22 Utah 2d 433, 454
P.2d 886, 889 (1969) (trial court may not
make a "further finding" that contravenes
jury's finding); Utah R.Civ.P. 49(a). Richards, however, misperceives the legal effect of the trial court's ruling.
It is axiomatic that, in a jury trial, the
jury determines the facts and the trial
court determines the law. Richards erroneously claims that the trial court "supplanted" the jury's factual findings regarding substantial performance with its own
factual findings. In reality, the trial court
simply applied the law to the jury's factual
finding that Brown did not substantially
perform his obligations under the contract.
There is no factual finding by the jury that
Brown could not recover anything under
the contract. That is a question of law.
The jury instruction and special interrogatory only explain that if Brown did not
substantially perform his duties under the
contract, he may not enforce the contract
Purdue, 30 Utah 2d 389, 391-92, 518 P.2d 684,
686 (1974) (Ellctt, J. dissenting) (quoting 17
AmJur2d, Contracts § 365). See, e.g., Darrell J.
Didencksen <Si Sons v. Magna Water and Sewer
Improvement Dist., 613 P.2d 1116. 1119 (Utah
1980); Wagstaff v. Remco, Inc., 540 P.2d 931,
933 (Utah 1975).
4. The following instruction, with our emphasis,
was given to the jury regarding substantial performance:
In order for a party to recover on a contract, said party must first establish by a preponderance of the evidence his own substantial performance. A parly who seeks to take
advantage of a right under the contract is
charged with the burden of proving the facts

against Richards. They do not indicate
that, under all circumstances, Brown would
be barred from recovering anything under
the contract.
Whether Brown could recover anything
under the contract was Richards's decision.
Richards could either: (1) rescind the contract, in which case Brown would not recover anything under the contract but would
receive back that which he had conferred
upon Richards, i.e., ownership of Interwest;
or (2) elect to enforce the contract, in which
case Richards would retain ownership of
Interwest and Brown would be entitled to
recover under the contract, after adjustments for his lack of performance. Sidney
Stevens Implement Co. v. Hintze, 92 Utah
264, 67 P.2d 632, 638 (1937). Richards
elected to enforce the contract. Richards's
election allows Brown to recover under the
contract, even though Brown himself could
not have enforced the contract given the
jury's factual finding.
[8] In addition to his substantial performance defense, Richards raised a fraud
defense, under which he was likewise entitled either to rescind the contract and tender back ownership of Interwest or to retain ownership and seek damages. Id.; see
also Dugan, 615 P.2d at 1247; Perry v.
Woodall, 20 Utah 2d 399, 401-02, 438 P.2d
813, 815 (1968). In light of Richards's election to retain ownership and enforce the
contract, the jury was requested to find the
difference between the actual value of Interwest, as received by Richards, and the
value Interwest would have had if it had
been as represented. This value differennecessary to show he has substantially performed his side of the bargain.
A party substantially performs his side of
the contract where there has been no willful
departure from the terms of the contract, and
no omission in significant points, and the
contract has been performed in its material
and substantial particulars. // a party fails
substantially to perform his duties under the
contract, the law does not require the other
party to perform or adhere to the contractual
terms. Under those circumstances, the doctrine of substantial performance freleasesf the
second party
from his contractual obligations and duties.

:

tial is the "benefit of the bargain" rule that
is followed in this jurisdiction. Lamb, 525
' P.2d at 609; see also Dugan, 615 P.2d at
1247; Dilworth v. Lauritzen, 18 Utah 2d
386, 389, 424 P.2d 136, 137-38 (1967); Pace,
2A1 P.2d at 277. The jury found the value
differential to be $500,000.
Richards
claims that he is entitled to collect the
$500,000 as a cash award and to retain
ownership of Interwest without making
any further payments therefor.

F«.w

If Richards has not paid
purchase rprice
an amount sufficient to satisfy the adjusted purchase price, he must satisfy the unpaid portion in order to retain ownership of
Interwest. Otherwise, he receives much
more than his benefit of the bargain.
Richards relies on Lamb v. Bangart, 525
P.2d 602 (Utah 1974), in asserting that he is
entitled to forgiveness of the debt and recovery of differential damages under the
benefit of the bargain rule. Richards's reliance on Lamb is misplaced. In Lamb, the
purchasers entered into a contract to pay
$50,000 for one-half interest in a breeding
bull. After paying a $20,000 deposit and
entering into a contract to pay the remaining $30,000 in one year, the purchasers
discovered that the bull was injured and
unable to produce. The bull's health was
so feeble that the bull was shot shortly
after the contract was signed.

[9] Brown correctly points out that if
Richards is allowed to obtain full ownership of Interwest for only the amount already paid and collect the difference between the value of Interwest as represented and as received, Richards would reap a
windfall. He would collect a double recovery, i.e., a $500,000 cash award and forgiveness of his contractual obligation to
Brown, worth approximately $700,000.5
Such a double recovery would be contrary
Richards relies upon the supreme court's
to the benefit of the bargain rule. The statement that "[i]n the instant action, the
clear rationale of the rule is that because balance of the unpaid purchase price was
of the seller's fraud, the purchaser paid irrelevant in determining the measure of
more for the asset than it was really worth. damages to which plaintiffs were entitled."
The purchaser therefore deserves to recoup In reality, the contract in Lamb provided
the overpayment. Benefit of the bargain that the additional outstanding $30,000
damages are, in effect, a refund to the payment would be excused if the bull died
purchaser of the overpayment in order to before the payment was due without probring the effective purchase price in line ducing 1,500 ampules of semen. Id. at 608.
with the actual value received. Both par- The contractual debt was therefore exties thereby receive the full benefit of the cused under the express terms of the conbargain; the defrauded party only pays, tract, and not as a common law remedy as
and the culpable party only receives, the claimed by Richards. Therefore, the outtrue value of the asset sold.
standing balance was clearly not relevant
[10,11] Where a contract is executory in Lamb.
and the purchase price has yet to be paid in
As a general proposition, the existence of
full, a cash award for the value differential
an outstanding balance is irrelevant to a
and a forgiveness of any outstanding debt
determination of the difference between
violates the goal of the benefit of the barthe true value of an asset and the value of
gain rule. Instead of receiving the true
the asset as misrepresented. The differvalue of the asset sold, Brown would reence would be the same regardless of
ceive only the amount paid, which, in this
whether the purchaser has paid the purcase, appears to be less than the true value
chase price in full or in part. An outstandof Interwest as found by the jury. Brown
ing balance is only relevant to a determinawould thereby not receive the benefit of
tion of whether the seller must pay the
the bargain. The fraud damages must
purchaser, or the purchaser the seller, in
therefore be offset against the contracted
5. Richards claims that there is no double recovery because the $500,000 fraud award reflects
consequential damages he incurred. Such a

claim is unfounded in that the special interrogatory asked only for the value differential, not
for consequential damages.
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order to reach the benefit of the bargain
being awarded.

by a different analytical approach. See
Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Associates,,
752 P.2d 892, 894-95 (Utah 1988).
The trial court awarded Brown his full
contract purchase price of $900,000 plus
interest at the rate of ten percent up until
the time of trial. It then awarded Richards
his fraud damages of $500,000 plus interest
at the rate of ten percent up until the time
of trial. In theory, the prejudgment interest awarded Richards thereby cancels out
the interest awarded Brown on the amount
that Brown defrauded Richards, i.e., the
$500,000. Under the trial court's analysis,
Richards was required to pay Brown interest on the amount Brown defrauded him.
The award of prejudgment interest to Richards on the fraud damages was apparently
an attempt to remedy this obvious injustice.

In the present case, Richards receives
the benefit of his bargain by having his
$500,000 award credited against the original purchase price of $900,000. The payments already paid by Richards toward the
purchase of Interwest must then be credited against an adjusted contract purchase
price of $400,000. The trial court failed to
follow this approach in its final judgment.
Instead, it erroneously gave Brown an
"award" on his claims that Richards
breached the Interwest purchase agreement, even though Richards proved that
Brown had defrauded him. Brown clearly
was not entitled to an award on his causes
of action to enforce the agreement. The
trial court should have addressed Brown's
entitlement to the purchase price under its
discussion of Richards's counterclaim for
Richards was entitled to the $500,000
fraud as being a result of Richards's election to enforce the contract. Accordingly, fraud award at the time he was defrauded,
we vacate any award inconsistent with this i.e., the contract date. At that time, Brown
had a voidable contract with a $900,000
approach.
purchase price. According to the jury,
On remand, the trial court shall deter- however, the true value of Interwest was
mine whether Brown must repay Richards, only $400,000. Brown therefore could not,
or Richards must pay Brown, using the as a matter of law, receive interest on the
adjusted purchase price of $400,000. If full $900,000 purchase price; he was only
such recalculations show that Richards still entitled to interest on the $400,000 adjusted
owes Brown, Brown is entitled to recover purchase price. Cf. Vasels v. LoGuidice,
such adjusted amounts under the contract.6 740 P.2d 1375, 1378 (Utah App.1987) ("[preThis is the legal result of Richards's elec- judgment] interest accrued as damages
tion to affirm and enforce the contract arising out of a valid contract determined
rather than to rescind it.
to have been breached by the other party.").
Prejudgment Interest
By offsetting the original purchase price
[12 J The trial court awarded Richards by the fraud damages at the time of conprejudgment interest on his $500,000 fraud tracting, we reach the same result as
award. Brown asserts that this was error awarded by the trial court Under this
since fraud damages are not determinable approach, we eliminate the perceived need
with mathematical certainty, a precondition for "prejudgment interest" on the fraud
to awarding prejudgment interest. See damages.
generally Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins,
Brown & Gunnell, Inc., 784 P.2d 475, 482
BREACH OF WARRANTY
(Utah App.1989). Without addressing the
[13] The jury found that Brown breachprejudgment interest debate directly, we ed the warranties made in the Interwest
reach the same net result as the trial court purchase agreement and thereby caused
6. By recalculating Richards's payments against
an initial principal amount of $400,000, rather
than the contract principal amount of 5900.000,
Richards will have effected a faster amortiza-
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tion. resulting in a different outstanding balance
at the time of trial than was found by the trial
court.
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Richards $100,000 in damages. The trial awards were duplicative. We therefore recourt ruled, without explanation, that the verse the trial court's ruling and reinstate
breach of warranty damages were duplica- the jury's award of $100,000 to Richards
tive of the fraud damages already found by for Brown's breach of warranty.
the jury, and set the jury's verdict aside.
FIDUCIARY DUTY
Richards claims that there is a nonduplicative basis for the breach of warranty award
[161 The trial court awarded Richards
and the trial court erred by merely assum- $300,000 in damages for Brown's breach of
ing that the award was duplicative.
a fiduciary duty during the period when
One nonduplicative basis of damages Brown and Richards were jointly operating
pointed to by Richards is his claim for Interwest. The breach arose from Brown's
repairs to Interwest's fuel farm. Brown involvement in borrowing against a line of
warranted that the assets of Interwest credit for operational costs when Richards
were in good and serviceable condition. In and Brown had an agreement that the line
reality, Interwest's fuel farm was in seri- of credit would only be used for purchasing
ous disrepair and did not meet fire code airplanes for resale. Richards had signed
standards. It cost Richards $176,000 to as a personal guarantor on the line of
repair the fuel farm. The costs of repair credit. Brown claims that there was no
were not included as damages under the evidence that he breached any fiduciary
fraud claim. They were only identified as duty owed to Richards.
a breach of warranty damage. The $176,The trial court instructed the jury that a
000 claim for repairs provides sufficient
breach of an understanding between joint
grounds for the jury to make a nonduplicaventurers could constitute a breach of fidutive award for breach of warranty.7
ciary duty.8 Richards points to the evi[14,15] A jury is allowed wide discre- dence of an agreement between Richards
tion in awarding damages. Bennion v. and Brown that the line of credit would
LeGrand Johnson Constr. Co., 701 P.2d only be used for aircraft acquisition.
1078, 1083 (Utah 1985). Courts must defer Brown claims there was no such agreement
to the jury's determination of damages un- and presents his favorable evidence to that
less (1) the jury disregarded competent evi- effect. The evidence was therefore in condence, (2) the award is so excessive beyond flict. Given the deference we grant jury
rational justification as to indicate the ef- findings, we must conclude the jury considfect of improper factors in the determina- ered the contradictory evidence and found
tion, and (3) the award was rendered under that the parties in fact had such an undera misunderstanding. Id. at 1084. No such standing and that Brown breached it.
errors appear in this case to justify the
Brown also claims that there was no
trial court in striking the jury's award.
The trial court's ruling amounted to noth- evidence that Richards was damaged by
ing more than mere speculation that the the use of the line of credit for operational
7. Arguably, Richards need not even prove that
there was a nonduplicative basis for the jury's
award because the proof required to prove
fraud differs from that required to prove a
breach of warranty. The jury may have simply
found that Brown did not commit fraud in
making some of the misrepresentations because
he lacked fraudulent intent, but that he did have
sufficient intent in making those representations to find a breach of warranty.
8. The trial court gave the jury the following
instruction:
To prevail on a claim for breach of fiduciary
duty, a party must prove by a preponderance
of the evidence:

(1) That the parties were engaged in a joint
venture;
(2) That one party took actions which benefitted himself at the expense of the joint venture and which were inconsistent with the
understanding of the parties or otherwise acted in a way inconsistent with the duties of
loyalty, good faith, fairness and honesty owed
by parties engaged in a joint venture to one
another; and
(3) That as a result, the other party suffered
damages.
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expenses. Brown's argument fails as a
matter of law because Richards became
legally obligated to satisfy a debt he did
not wish to incur in the joint venture, i.e.,
debt for the operations of Interwest. Richards has therefore presented sufficient evidence that he was damaged.
Finally, Brown asserts that the award of
$300,000 was not supported in the evidence.
Richards asserts that the principal and interest exceeds $300,000. Brown has not
marshaled the evidence in favor of the
award amount and has thereby failed to
meet his burden of showing that no reasonable person could find damages of $300,000. We therefore do not disturb the
jury's finding.
ATTORNEY FEES
The trial court found that Richards was
entitled to attorney fees as the prevailing
party in the dispute concerning the Interwest purchase agreement. The trial court
also found that Brown was entitled to attorney fees as the prevailing party in the
dispute concerning the Interwest Building
agreement. Without giving any calculations or explanations of the amounts, the
trial court then awarded Richards $435,000
for attorney fees pursuant to the Interwest
purchase agreement, and Brown $250,000
for attorney fees pursuant to the Interwest
Building agreement. Brown claims that
the trial court erred in its award of attorney fees to Richards both as to entitlement
and amount.

trary to the express terms of the Interwest
purchase agreement which, with our emphasis, contains the following attorney fees
provision:
In the event suit is brought to enforce
the provisions of this agreement, the
prevailing party in such action shall be
entitled to recover its reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in connection therewith.
As clearly stated, Brown agreed to compensate Richards if Richards prevails in a
suit brought to enforce the Interwest purchase agreement. The agreement expressly refers to the prevailing party in suits
relating to "this agreement," not the prevailing party in suits relating to "this
transaction." A review of the Interwest
purchase agreement and the Interwest
Building agreement shows that they are
independent and may therefore be enforced
separately. See Bess v. Jensen, 782 P.2d
542, 544 (Utah App.1989) (significant factor
in determining independence of contracts is
whether they are supported by separate
valid consideration).

[18,19] Had Brown brought two separate lawsuits, one on each agreement, Richards would clearly have received attorney
fees in the case regarding the purchase of
Interwest.9 The fact that a single lawsuit
was brought to enforce both contracts does
not eviscerate Richards's contractual right
to attorney fees. The prevailing party on a
given contract may recover fees without
consideration of other claims in the same
Entitlement
case arising from other contracts between
[17] Brown asserts that he alone is enti- the parties. See Elder v. Triax Co., 740
tled to attorney fees. He argues that the P.2d 1320, 1323 (Utah 1987). To hold othentire transaction should be combined as if erwise would create a disincentive to comthere were but one attorney fee provision bine permissive counterclaims into one lawfor the entire transaction. He would then suit. We therefore do not collapse the
be the prevailing party since he received a independent agreements involved in this
"net judgment" greater than that received multifaceted transaction and "net out" a
by Richards. Such an argument is con- single prevailing party.10
9.

Despite the trial court's mischaracterization of
Brown's entitlement of payment under the contract as an "award," Brown's receipt of the purchase price could not properly be considered a
judgment in Brown's favor when it was awarded pursuant to Richards's election to affirm the
fraudulently induced contract. Brown there-

fore did not receive any judgment to be "netted"
against Richards's award of $500,000.
10. Even if the contracts were merged into one,
both parties are entitled to fees when both partics arc successful in enforcing different provisions of a contract against the other. Trayner v.

Calculation
.<[20-22] Despite the fact that Richards
[24,25] Brown asserts that the trial
was awarded damages on his fraud and
breach of fiduciary duty claims, Brown ar- court erred in the amount of attorney fees
gues that he actually prevailed because awarded to Richards because it did not
Richards did not obtain the full amount he follow the guidelines set forth in Dixie
was seeking. According to Brown, he "de- State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah
feated" Richards on 90% of his fraud and 1988). The supreme court recognized in
breach of fiduciary duty claims because Dixie State Bank that the calculation of
Richards only received 107© of his claimed attorney fees is in the sound discretion of
damages. Such reasoning ignores the ines- the trial court and will not be overturned
capable fact that while Richards may not absent a showing of a clear abuse of discrehave prevailed to the full extent he felt tion. Id. at 988. It then set forth several
entitled, he nevertheless prevailed. It is factors that trial courts should consider in
the determination of culpability, not the awarding attorney fees. In particular, it
amount of damages, that determines who is identified the following four questions that
the prevailing party. See Highland a trial court should answer before awardConstr. Co. v. Stevenson, 636 P.2d 1034, ing attorney fees,
1038 (Utah 1981) ("a party in whose favor
1. What legal work was actually peran affirmative judgment is rendered,
formed?
whether or not the judgment is for less
than initially sought in the complaint, is the
2. How much of the work performed
'prevailing party' "). While a reduction in
was reasonably necessary to adethe amount claimed by a plaintiff may
quately prosecute the matter?
seem a moral and financial victory for a
3. Is the attorney's billing rate consisdefendant, it does not make the defendant
tent with the rates customarily
the "prevailing party" in terms of attorney
charged in the locality for similar
fees. Brown's claim he "prevailed" thereservices?
fore fails.
4.
Are there circumstances which re[23] Brown also claims that the trial
quire consideration of additional faccourt failed to award him some of his legal
tors ... ?
fees to which he was entitled. Brown successfully defended against Richards's ef- Id. at 990 (footnotes omitted). See also
forts to rescind contracts unrelated to the Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d
sale of the Interwest assets. The trial 266, 268 (Utah 1992) ("Except in the most
court, however, dismissed these efforts be- simple cases, the evidence should include
cause it perceived them to be only a minor the hours spent on the case, the hourly rate
portion of the overall lawsuit and did not or rates charged for those hours, and usual
award any attorney fees therefor. As is and customary rates for such work.").
evident from our previous analysis, Brown
Trial courts should make findings on all
was entitled to an award of attorney fees
of the factors they consider in awarding
for successfully defending his contractual attorney fees. See, e.g., Cabrera v. Cottrights on contracts unrelated to the sale of rell, 694 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1985). In the
the Interwest assets, even if such efforts present case, the trial court acknowledged
were not a significant portion of the overall that it was "unable to arrive at allowable
lawsuit. We therefore direct the trial fees and costs with mathematical certaincourt to address Brown's claim on remand.
claims" and propriety of awarding fees only for
Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984); see also
Stacey Properties v. Wixen, 766 P.2d 1080, 1085
(Utah App. 1988) (fees are appropriate for partial
success); cf. Graco Fishing & Rental Tools, Inc.
v. Ironwood Exploration, Inc., 766 P.2d 1074,
1079-80 (Utah 1988) (suggesting need to "differentiate between the time spent on the successful
claim[s] and the time spent on unsuccessful

the former). But see Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551. 555-56 (Utah
App.1989) (applying disfavored "net judgment"
approach in holding only one prevailing party
under circumstances of the case, even though
both parties received monetary damages).
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ty." " It proceeded to list a few factors
that it considered, none of which answer
the basic questions posed in Dixie State
Bank. It then summarily awarded Richards $435,000. The findings do not indicate
what work was actually performed in relation to the contractual claims upon which
Richards prevailed and that it was necessary, nor do they indicate the billing rate of
Richards's counsel and the customary rate
in this market.
In this case, the award of attorney fees
is a complex matter due to the adjudication
of multiple claims arising under several
contracts with each party winning some
and losing some. Given the complexities,
the trial court's summary findings are simply too sparse for us to determine whether
the trial court made a permissible award.
"Unless the record clearly and uncontrovertedly support's the trial court's decision,
the absence of adequate findings of fact
precludes appellate review of the evidentiary basis underlying the trial court's decision and requires remand for more detailed
findings by the trial court." Quinn v.
Quinn, 830 P.2d 282, 286 (Utah App.1992)
(failure to make adequate findings regarding attorney fees was an abuse of discretion). See also Martindale v. Adams, 111
P.2d 514, 518 (Utah App.1989) (trial court
must identify the factors upon which it
relies in awarding attorney fees in order
"to permit meaningful review").
[26] When a party is contractually entitled to attorney fees, the trial court's findings regarding those fees should be just as
complete as its findings regarding other
types of contractual damages. See Cottonwood Mall, 830 P.2d at 268. "These findings must be sufficiently detailed, and include enough subsidiary facts, to disclose
the steps by which the trial court's decision
was reached." Quinn, 830 P.2d at 286.
11. Wc note that had the trial court followed the
approach outlined in Dixie State Dank, it might
not have reached mathematical certainty, but it
would have achieved a reasonable basis for its
award. This is our objective in requiring trial
courts to follow a more disciplined approach in
awarding attorney fees.
12. On remand, Richards
must set out the time and fees expended for
(1) successful claims lor which there may be

We conclude in this case that the trial court
abused its discretion by not adequately setting forth its analysis in a manner permitting appellate review. We therefore vacate
the award of attorney fees to Richards and
remand for a recalculation in accordance
with this opinion.12
On Appeal
[27] Both parties seek attorney fees on
appeal. The general rule is that when a
party who received attorney fees below
prevails on appeal, the party is also entitled
to fees reasonably incurred on appeal.
Management Servs. v. Development Assocs., 617 P.2d 406, 408-09 (Utah 1980). A
review of the issues on appeal reveals that
they relate to the Interwest purchase
agreement and that Richards was successful on each major issue discussed with the
exception of his argument that he was entitled both to the $500,000 fraud award and
to forgiveness of his contractual debt.
While Brown was successful in limiting the
amount claimed by Richards on the fraud
claim, Richards nevertheless prevailed on
the issue of culpability and is therefore the
prevailing party on appeal.

The one issue that Brown has prevailed
upon on appeal was the question of whether the trial court erred in not awarding him
attorney fees for his successes in defending against Richards's efforts to rescind
other contracts. Inasmuch as Brown successfully defended a contractual right denied by the trial court, he is entitled to his
reasonable attorney fees which he can
show were incurred on that issue on appeal. Naturally, Richards is not entitled to
any fees he incurred in unsuccessfully defending against this claimed error.
Attorney fees and costs arising from this
appeal are therefore awarded in general to
an entitlement to attorney fees, (2) unsuccessful claims for which there would have been
an entitlement to attorney fees had the claims
been successful, and (3) claims for which
there is no entitlement to attorney fees.
Cottonwood Mail, 830 P.2d at 269-70. The trial
court's findings should then mirror the foregoing categories so that they may be reviewable.
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Richards and in limited part to Brown. On
remand, the parties are to make their respective evidentiary showings of reasonable fees as outlined in this opinion.
CONCLUSION
We reverse the trial court's refusal to
grant Richards a directed verdict on
Brown's claim that there was an unwritten
agreement to increase the purchase price
of Interwest. The parties' benefit of the
bargain is to be calculated by the trial
court at the time of contracting by deducting the jury's award of $500,000 from the
initial contract price of $900,000 for an
adjusted purchase price of $400,000. Richards's election to retain ownership of Interwest requires him to satisfy any outstanding obligation to Brown under the terms of
the Interwest purchase agreement based
upon the adjusted purchase price of $400,000. The trial court is directed on remand
to recalculate Richards's outstanding balance and interest owing at the time of trial.
We reinstate the jury's verdict that Richards was entitled to $100,000 on his breach
of warranty claim. We affirm the award
of $300,000 on Richards's breach of fiduciary duty claim. We also affirm the trial
court's determination that Richards was entitled to attorney fees, but vacate the
award and remand for a redetermination of
the amount of fees. We also reverse the
trial court's failure to award Brown attorney fees for his successful efforts in enforcing his contractual rights unrelated to
the sale of the Interwest assets.
We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs and attorney fees on appeal are awarded as described herein.
BILLINGS and GARFF, JJ., concur.
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Mother appealed from an order of the
District Court, Iron County, J. Philip Eves,
J., which denied her motion for relief from
a Utah order enforcing an undomesticated
Ohio child custody order. The Court of
Appeals, Russon, J., held that: (1) district
court not only erred in determining that it
had no jurisdiction, but also erred in refusing to hold a hearing to examine whether
jurisdiction should be exercised; (2) Utah
district court erred in enforcing undomesticated Ohio custody modification order
when it, in fact, was obligated to enforce
the only document legally before it, the
original Ohio divorce decree, which granted
custody of the parties' child to mother; (3)
commissioner and district court violated
mother's due process rights by refusing
her attorney's request for a hearing on the
undomesticated Ohio order; and (4) district
court erred in permitting commissioner to
exceed her authority.
Reversed and remanded.
Orme, J., filed a specially concurring
opinion in which Billings, J., joined.

1. Appeal and Error <S=>842(1), 982(2)
Generally, Court of Appeals will only
reverse a denial of a motion to vacate an
order or judgment upon a showing of
abuse of discretion by trial court, however,
when denial of such a motion rests on an
underlying jurisdictional determination, it
becomes a question of law upon which
court does not have to defer to the district
court. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 60(b).
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BOYD J. BROWN, an individual,
and INTERWEST AVIATION
CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation,

MINUTE ENTRY

Plaintiffs and
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CASE NO. 870901411

vs.
DAVID K. RICHARDS & COMPANY
and DAVID K. RICHARDS, an
individual,
Defendants and
Counter Plaintiffs.

The

Court

announced

its

oral

fees/cost issues on April 1, 1996.

decision

in the

attorney's

Thereafter, defendants filed a

Motion for Further Reconsideration of the Court's April 1, 1996
Ruling Regarding Attorney's Fees. Also, defendants filed Richards'
Objection and to Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Judgment and Memorandum in Support of Richards' Motion
for Reconsideration.

Following replies thereto, the Court heard

oral arguments thereon on June 17, 1996.

Because some of the

materials and case law was submitted too late for the Court's
consideration and the Court wanted to further consider its rulings
on the post-appeal
advisement.

fees and costs, the matter was taken under
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The Court has now had an opportunity to review and consider
the

authorities

submitted

and

has

recanvassed

considerable

materials.
Any attack on fees found by this Court to be reasonable for
Richards is unwarranted by a comparison with fees awarded earlier
by this Court to Brown.

The Brown fees were not appealed, while

the Richards' fees were, thus subjecting the Richards' fees to a
review consistent with the remand instructions of the Utah Court of
Appeals.

Although counsel may criticize the methodology directed

to be utilized by this Court in arriving at reasonable fees, this
Court has no similar freedom.

Even though the proofs presented at

remand hearing were admittedly not in conformity with the Court of
Appeals'

remand

instructions,

the

Court

nonetheless

made

a

significant effort to consider the factors outlined by the Utah
Court of Appeals in arriving at reasonable

fees to be awarded

Richards.
The fees of $218,986.42 found to be reasonable by the Court
for services rendered by counsel for Richards through trial shall
remain the same as previously announced by the Court in its April
1, 1996 oral decision.

Also, the $80,987.28 found to be reasonable

by the Court for services rendered by counsel for Richards on the
appeal shall remain the same.

In addition, the Court's rulings on
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costs were based on the usual and ordinary interpretation of the
word "costs" used in the contract; and the rulings on costs shall
remain as previously made.

The broader term "expenses" was not

used in the contract.
The Court has reconsidered its rulings on post-appeal fees and
costs in light of the majority opinion of the Utah Supreme Court in
the case of David L. Salmon v. Davis County, et al., 916 P. 2d 890
(Utah 1996) . In view of the majorities' allowance of fees incurred
in seeking fees, the Court revisits the post-appeal fee and cost
issue.
As

in all

evidence

on

other

the

fee claims, Richards' attorneys

number

of

hours

spent,

their

adduced

hourly

rates,

previously found by the Court to be consistent with those rates
customarily charged in the community, and they generally described
the tasks performed, or services rendered.
clients

were

involved.

submitted

in

support

of

the

The billings to the
time

and

services

The overall time expended by counsel post-appeal has

been questioned by plaintiffs' counsel.
In the announced decision of April 1, 1996, the claim for
$78,169.32 was disallowed by the Court for failure to allocate time
and services.

On reflection, the Court concludes it was wrong.

Except for time expended on post-judgment lien and security
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problems

and

the
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form

and

content

of

supplemental

Findings,

Conclusions and post-appeal Judgments, which include some other
issues involving

accounting,

interest computation

and

possibly

others, the substantial time and efforts of Richards' attorneys has
been directed to the attorney's fee, costs and relevant interest
issues.
The Court finds that counsel for Richards used "block billing11
in this case.

The testimony of George T. Naegle and David B.

Thompson on time recording and billing practices, i.e., recording
time and billing therefore for specific tasks was very credible.
As

Mr. Naegle

testified,

the

insurance

industry

particualrized billings since the late 1980's.

has

required

Moreover, their

testimony is consistent with the remand instructions of the Utah
Court of Appeals in this case and in the earlier pronouncements of
both the Utah Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
Because time was not entered and accounted for by specific
tasks,

the

internal

allocate time.
manually

accounting

system

could

not

mechanically

As a result, many needless hours were expended

allocating

time,

which

could

have

efficiently handled as an accounting function.

been

much

more

Moreover, many

hours and much expense has been incurred in the fee debate.
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The combined fee-cost request of $78,169.32 for post-appeal
time

and

expense

unreasonable.

is

found

Allowing

by

the

Court

60% thereof

achieve a more reasonable allowance.

to

be

excessive

and

is found by the Court to
Accordingly, in addition to

the amounts awarded in the April 1, 1996 decision, the Court finds
it reasonable to award defendants' counsel an additional $46,901.59
in fees for post-appeal time and expenses, with interest thereon at
the rate of 10% per annum from and after July 1, 1995 to date of
post-appeal judgment.
With respect to the post-judgment interest issue, the Court
has again reviewed the James Constructors, Inc. case, Mason v.
Western Mortgage Loan Corporation, 754 P.2d 984 (Utah App. 1988),
and the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals in this case.

This

Court found what it had determined to be reasonable fees through
trial for both Brown and Richards and entered Judgment thereon on
October 18, 1990.

Although Presiding Judge Bench at page 157 of

the decision reported
"vacated",

it

redetermination

is
of

in 840 P. 2d 143 indicated the award was

clear
the

that
amount

the

case

of

fees."

was

remanded

Based

"for

thereon,

a

the

rationale of the Mason case is applicable. Accordingly, defendants
Richards are awarded post-judgment interest at the rate of 12% per
annum on the $218,986.42 from and after October 18, 1990 until paid
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The Court concludes that all Judgment rates of

interest are the applicable statutory interest rate at the date of
entry

of

the

Judgment,

and

said

throughout the life of the Judgment.

Judgment

rate

shall

remain

All other amounts awarded in

the bench decision of April 1, 1996 and the $46,901.59 awarded
herein shall bear interest at the rate of 10% per annum from and
after February 3, 1995 to date of Judgment, with the applicable
Judgment rate thereon applying as of the date of the entry of the
post-appeal Judgment and to continue in force and effect until paid
or fully satisfied.
Plaintiffs'

Motion

Defendants' Memorandum
Supplemental

for

Fees

and

in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion

for

Attorney's

Fees

Supplemental

have

been

Attorney's

reviewed

in

light

of

defendants' Objections.

The post-appeal Findings and Conclusions

need to be supplemented.

The Court has reviewed plaintiffs' claim

for supplemental fees in the amount of $7,879.50.
that

the

time

expended

by

Brown's

attorneys

The Court finds
in

successfully

defending against Richards' efforts to rescind contracts unrelated
to the sale of

Interwest assets and

in successful efforts

in

enforcing contractual rights unrelated to the sale of Interwest
assets was reasonable, that their hourly rates were appropriate and
well within the rates customarily charged in the community for such
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charges.

The
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Court

finds

the

amount

of

$7,879.50

to

be

a

reasonable charge for the services rendered, and concludes that
Brown should be awarded Judgment therefore, together with 10% per
annum interest from and after February 3, 1995 to date of Judgment,
with the applicable Judgment rate thereon applying as of the date
of the entry of the post-appeal Judgment and to continue in force
and effect until paid or fully satisfied.
Attorneys for plaintiffs shall prepare new Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law on Post-Appeal Matters and a new Post-Appeal
Judgment in conformance with the April 1, 1996 bench decision, as
modified

hereby.

The

post-appeal

Findings,

Conclusions

and

Judgment shall then be submitted to counsel for defendants to sign
"approved as to form."

Thereafter, they shall be submitted to

Judge Henriod for signature and entry.
Dated this ^ T ^ d a y of December, 199 6.
/

y

iTlT) /*Zi?vt\
KENNETH RIGTRUP
DISTRICT COURT JUD

J
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foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this

/ H

day of

January, 199 6:

Bruce E. Coke
John W. Call
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
33 3 North 3 00 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Robert S. Campbell, Jr., Esq.
201 S. Main, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Elizabeth T. Dunning
Attorney for Defendants
111 E. Broadway, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

BOYD J. BROWN, an individual,
and INTERWEST AVIATION
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation

;
;
]

vs.

]>
])
)
]>

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
ON POST APPEAL MATTERS
(POST RECONSIDERATION)

DAVID K. RICHARDS &
COMPANY and DAVID K.
RICHARDS, an individual,

])
;i
;

Civil No. C87-01411
Judge: Stephen L. Henroid

Plaintiffs and
Counter Defendants,

Defendants and
Counter Plaintiffs.

]
]

Subsequent to the appeal in this case, the court has heard evidence and argument
regarding a number of issues, including defendants' ("Richards") trial, appeal and post-appeal
attorney fees, a limited portion of plaintiffs' ("Brown") attorneys fees, pre-judgment and postjudgment interest and recoverable costs.
Pursuant to motion, the court on August 29, 1994 heard argument on Brown's motion
for partial summary judgment issues of interest and post-appeal fees.

The court ruled that

compound interest was improper; that Richards was entitled to pre-judgment interest on the
breach of warranty damages from April 24, 1984, at the contract rate of 10%; and that Richards
was entitled to pre-judgment interest on the yet-to-be-determined attorneys fees. The court
reserved a decision on the issue of Richards' post-appeal fees.
The court permitted the plaintiff to elicit testimony from defendants' attorneys via sworn
courtroom testimony of Elizabeth T. Dunning on April 12, 1994, which testimony continued via
deposition on April 20, 1994. The court also granted Brown's motion to hold a full evidentiary
hearing on attorney fees, which hearing was from January 31, 1995 through February 3, 1995.
During that hearing Brown and Richards both called witnesses in support of their respective
positions on attorneys fees. The transcripts of Ms. Dunning's testimony were also submitted.
The Court announced its decision on April 1, 1996.
On June 17, 1996 the Court heard argument on Richard's motion to reconsider and took
the matter under advisement. The court has also heard argument of the issue of interest-and has
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on the attorneys fees and interest issues.
After considering the evidence and arguments of counsel, the court now makes and enters its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The total time expended by the attorneys for both parties was reasonably close and

to some extent validates the overall reasonableness of time and services rendered by the
attorneys in pursuing the case to conclusion. However, the Brown fees were not appealed, while
the Richards' fees were, thus subjecting the Richards' fees to review consistent with the remand
instructions of the Utah Court of Appeals. Even though the proofs presented at the remand
2

hearing were admittedly not in conformity with the remand instructions, the Court nonetheless
made a significant effort to consider the factors outlined by the court of appeals in arriving at
reasonable fees to be awarded to Richards.
2.

The hourly billing rates charged by counsel for defendants, while somewhat higher

than those billed by plaintiffs' attorneys, were nonetheless generally consistent with rates
customarily charged in the community for similar services considering the complexities of the
litigation involved and the experience and skills of defendants' counsel.
3.

Defendants' counsel did not allocate time based on individual claims because of

the impracticality of doing so. It would be difficult if not impossible in many instances to know
how efforts made might relate to one claim or another. There was an overlapping of the
warranty evidence and fraud evidence such that one could not allocate the time expended to one
claim or the other with any degree of precision. The entries in the billing of defendants' counsel
are like those of counsel for plaintiffs, quite general and vague.
4.

Over 200 hours were expended by counsel for defendants following the appeal in

attempting to allocate time expended in this case.
5.

Of the $1,450,000.00 found by the jury in favor of Richards, $100,000 was found

by the jury as damages resulting to breach of warranties. In achieving that result, counsel for
defendants, in pursuing the claims of the counterclaim, dealt with the issues of fraud, negligent
misrepresentation, breach of warranty, breach of fiduciary duty, punitive damages and damages.
In addition, defendants pursued a claim for rescission which ultimately was dropped prior to

3

trial. Also, a part performance claim was asserted by them when the case was submitted to the
jury.
6.

In defending plaintiffs' complaint, defendants' counsel dealt with issues relating

to the sale of assets as well as issues relating to the sale of the building which were generally
less difficult and more straight forward. Defendants' counsel dealt with tax issues, rent issues,
continuance problems and the extended problems relating to defendants' damage claims, efforts
in seeking mandamus, problems relating to the undertaking of security and other miscellaneous
problems along the way.
7.

The theme of Richards' case was fraud. Defendants' counsel carried that claim

to the jury by clear and convincing evidence by far the greater quantity of evidence and the
greater number of witnesses supported negligent misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty.
The result of expenditure of time, efforts and expenses are clearly mirrored in the jury's verdict.
8.

On appeal the defendants successfully defeated plaintiffs' claims to an increased

purchase price of $500,000 for the Interwest assets when Richards did not exercise the option
to purchase the executive air terminal building, which was a significant appeal issue.

In

addition, defendants successfully reinstated the $100,000 breach of warranty verdict on appeal.
9.

Brown and Interwest on the other hand successfully defended Richards' claim for

rescission for which Brown was entitled to an award of fees.
10.

Brown and Interwest prevailed in gaining a remand on the issue of the fees

awarded by the trial court to Richards through trial.
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11.

There were a number of other issues raised on appeal which were considered but

were not treated by the court of appeals in its decision.
12.

The Court has reconsidered Richards' claim for post-appeal fees in light of the

Utah Supreme Court's opinion allowing fees incurred in seeking fees in Salmon v. Davis Co.,
916 P.2d 890 (Utah 1996).
13.

The substantial time and efforts of Richards' attorneys post-appeal, except for time

expended on post-judgment lien and security issues, on the form and content of supplemental
Findings, Conclusions and Post-Appeal Judgments (which include other issues involving
accounting, interest computations, etc.), have been directed to attorney fees, costs and relevant
interest issues.
14.

Counsel for Richards' comst 1 used "block-billing" in this case. The testimony

of George T. Naegle and David B. Thompson on time recording and billing practices, i.e.
recording time and billing therefore for the specific tasks was very credible. As Mr. Naegle
testified, the insurance industry has required particularized billings since the late 1980's.
Moreover, their testimony is consistent with the remand instructions of the Utah Court of
Appeals in this case and the earlier pronouncements of the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah
Court of Appeals.
15.

Because time was not entered and accounted for by specific tasks, the internal

accounting system could not mechanically allocate time. As a result, many needless post-appeal
hours were spent allocating time, which could have been much more efficiently handled as an
accounting function.
5

16.

Moreover, many hours and expense have been incurred in the fee debate.

Having made and entered the foregoing Findings of Fact and having considered its
previous rulings, the Court now makes and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The court concludes that the allocation of fees by defendants' counsel allocates

more time to defendants' claims of breach of warranty than is reasonable and fair. The court
concludes that a more reasonable allocation of time expended in successfully pursuing that claim
would be generally 35% of the total time expended through trial. Based upon the total fees
generated through trial, this results in a presently allowable fee to Richards of $218,986.42.
2.

The court concludes that the allocation of fees by defendants' counsel allocates

more time to defendants' successful claims on appeal and makes no allowance for the fact that
plaintiffs prevailed on many issues. The defendants' request of $134,751.00 for fees incurred
on appeal and for aejt unsuccessful petition for certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court does not
allocate those fees to any particular claims. The court finds that a more reasonable allocation
of time in successfully pursuing the appeal would be 60% of the total fees expended by
defendants' counsel, or $80,987.28 awarded to Richards for appeals fees.
3.

Defendants seek attorneys fees and costs incurred on post-appeal matters from

November 1, 1993 through February 1, 1995 in the amount of $78,169.32. This amount is
excessive and unreasonable. The Court finds that 60% of that amount, or $46,901.59, is
reasonable, with interest of 10% per annum from and after July 1, 1995 to the date of the postappeal Judgment.
6

4.

As found by the court of appeals, plaintiffs' counsel is entitled to fees incurred

in successfully resisting defendants' rescission claim. The Court finds the hourly rates charged
by Brown's counsel were appropriate and well within the rates customarily charged in the
community for such services, and therefore plaintiffs are entitled to fees against defendants in
the principal amount of $7,879.50, with 10% interest per annum thereon from February 3, 1995
until the date of the post-appeal judgment. Thereafter judgment interest shall accrue at the rate
of 7.45% per annum on the principal amount.
5.

The language of the contract in question provides for recovery to the prevailing

party of its reasonable attorneys fees and costs. The broader term "expenses" was not used in
the contract. The court construes costs in its usual and ordinary meaning.
6.

There appears to be no dispute in defendants' appellate costs and defendants are

therefore entitled to recover appeal costs of $1,835.09.
7.

Defendants are entitled to recoverable trial costs of $235.00 for filing fees and

$955.00 for witness fees, for a total of $1,190.00.
8.

The court concludes that other identifiable expenses incurred by defendants are

not properly recoverable as costs.
9.

The Court, under James Constructors, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 888

P.2d 665 (Utah App. 1994) (decided after this court's August 29, 1994 ruling), concludes that
pre-judgment interest on attorney fees is appropriate. Although the Utah Court of Appeals'
opinion in this case indicated Richards' fee award was "vacated," it is clear that the case was
remanded "for a redetermination of the amount of fees." 840 P.2d at 157. Accordingly, the
7

rationale of Mason v. Western Mortgage, ISA P.2d 984 (Utah App. 1988) is applicable.
Therefore, the court concludes that it would be fair and reasonable to award pre-judgment
interest on the attorney fees awarded by this court at the rate of 12% per annum on the trial fees
of $218,986.42 from and after October 18, 1990.
10.

The Court concludes that all judgment rates of interest for new amounts awarded

in the post-appeal judgement are fees and costs awarded pursuant to the contracts between the
parties. These awards must therefore bear interest at the contract rate of 10% per annum.
DATED this

Qr{ day of

//UcU^A^ , 1997.
BY THE COURT:

STEPHEN L/HENROID, DISTRICT JUDGE

V
Approved As To Form:

J^^^^W
Attorneys for Defendants

c:\wpwin\jwcpld\brn-reco. ff
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
BOYD J. BROWN, an individual,
and INTERWEST AVIATION
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation

2.1 [? y * f o

Plaintiffs and
Counter Defendants,
POST-APPEAL JUDGMENT
(POST RECONSIDERATION)

vs.

DAVID K. RICHARDS &
COMPANY and DAVID K.
RICHARDS, an individual,

Civil No. C87-01411
Judge: Stephen L. Henroid

Defendants and
Counter Plaintiffs.
The trial by jury in the above cause began February 28, 1989 and concluded with the
jury's verdict on April 22, 1989. The jury returned a special verdict which was incorporated
in the Final Judgment entered by the court on October 18, 1990. Thereafter the parties appealed
and an opinion was rendered in Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143 (Utah App. 1992) by the Utah
Court of Appeals.
Pursuant to the direction of the Utah Court of Appeals, the October 18, 1990 judgment
is to be modified to reduce the $900,000.00 purchase price, by the $500,000.00 awarded to

defendants ("Richards") for fraud, to $400,000.00 and to vacate the judgment in favor of
plaintiffs ("Brown") for a $500,000.00 increase in purchase price. The jury's verdict awarding
$100,000.00 to Richards on his breach of warranty counterclaim is to be reinstated. The other
awards on Brown's claims and Richards' claims were affirmed, except the attorney fee award
to Richards was vacated by the court of appeals and the matter remanded for a redetermination
of the amount of fees due Brown.
This Court was directed to determine the amount of fees Brown was entitled to in
enforcing his contractual rights unrelated to the asset sale. Accordingly, this Court took
evidence from the parties and their attorneys, culminating in an evidentiary hearing held from
January 30, 1995 through February 3, 1995. The Court announced its decision on April 1,
1996. On June 17, 1996 the Court heard argument on Richards' motion to reconsider and took
the matter under advisement. The court has also heard argument of the issue of interest and has
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on the attorneys fees and interest issues.
Now, therefore, being duly advised in the premises, it is therefore:
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
I.
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ON AMENDED COMPLAINT.
1.

On plaintiffs' first cause of action, judgment is hereby entered in favor of Boyd

J. Brown and against David K. Richards individually, and David K. Richards & Company in
the amount of $200,000.00 ($450,000.00 contract price, less $250,000.00, one-half of the
$500,000.00 reduction ordered by the Utah Court of Appeals), subject to the following interest,
credits and adjustments:
2

Accrued Contract Interest:
Less Total Payments:
Principal Balance due on 4-1-86:

$ 23,506.20
$ 164.925.00
$ 58,581.20

Interest has accrued from April 1, 1986 on the unpaid balance at the rate of 10% per annum,
pursuant to the contract. Through February 1, 1997 the accrued interest is $63,461.01. Brown
is therefore awarded judgment in the amount of $122,042.21, principal and interest through
February 1, 1997. Interest shall continue to accrue from that date at the contract interest rate
of 10% per annum on the $58,581.20 principal balance.
2.

On the plaintiffs' second cause of action, judgment is entered in favor of Boyd

J. Brown and against David K. Richards individually and David K. Richards & Company in the
amount of $200,000.00 ($450,000.00 contract price, less $250,000.00, one-half of the
$500,000.00 reduction ordered by the Utah Court of Appeals), subject to the following interest,
credits and adjustments:
Accrued Contract Interest:
Less Total Payments:
Balance due on 4-1-86
Interest on unpaid balance on 12/89
Principal Judgment as of 12/20/89

$ 22,542.00
$ 53.693.90
$168,848.10
$ 11,301.64
$181,149.74

The principal balance due has accrued interest at the contract rate of 10% per annum -in the
amount of $182,913.19, as of February 1, 1997, together with additional interest on the interest
portion of the judgment balance from December 20, 1989 to February 1, 1997 of $8,046.76.
Brown is therefore awarded judgment in the amount of $372,109.69 as of February 1, 1997.
Interest shall continue to accrue at the contract interest rate of 10% per annum on the balance.

3

3.

On plaintiffs' sixth cause of action regarding the increased purchase price,

pursuant to the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals the judgment previously awarded Brown
is hereby vacated.
4.

On plaintiffs' third cause of action, the jury found that David K. Richards

individually and David K. Richards & Company owed, at the time of trial, the amount of
$407,259.00 on the agreement to purchase the Interwest building. There remained at that time
$490,000.00 in principal which was not yet due, but which has now become due. The court
awarded Brown judgment for $529,996.10, which included $248,371.00 principal payments then
due. The last payment made by Richards, as indicated in exhibit D-269, included a $31,629.00
payment principal, leaving the principal due and owing, as of April 2, 1986, of $668,371.00.
All payments of principal and interest thereon have now become due and plaintiff Boyd J. Brown
is therefore awarded judgment in that amount against David K. Richards individually and David
K. Richards & Company.

Pursuant to the contract, interest accrues at the rate of 10% per

annum. Interest due thereon as of February 1, 1997 is $724,046.30, for a total judgment of
$1,392,417.30 as of February 1, 1997. Interest shall continue to accrue at the contract interest
rate of 10% per annum on the $668,371.00 principal balance.
5.

On plaintiffs' fourth cause of action, the court previously granted a motion for

directed verdict and this cause of action was dismissed with prejudice in the October 18, 1990
judgment.
6.

On plaintiffs' fifth cause of action, for rent on the Executive Building, the court

granted judgment in favor of Boyd J. Brown and against David K. Richards individually and
David K. Richards & Company in the principal amount of $230,141.00 together with interest
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then owing of $16,645.81. Since that time additional contract interest has accrued on the
principal through February 1, 1997 in the amount of $144,643.62, for a total judgment of
$391,430.43 as of February 1, 1997. Interest shall continue to accrue on the principal balance
of $230,141.00 at the contract rate.
7.

In addition to rent on the Executive Building, judgment was entered in the October

18, 1990 judgment in favor of Boyd J. Brown and against David K. Richards individually and
David K. Richards & Company for the rent on the Interwest Building in the principal amount
of $6,250.00, plus interest accruing through December 20, 1989 in the amount of $3,006.85.
Since December 20, 1989 the accrued interest at the contract rate is $4,445.01, for a total
judgment of $13,701.86 as of February 1, 1997. Interest shall continue to accrue on the
principal amount from that date at the contract rate.
8.

The October 18, 1990 judgment was entered in favor of Boyd J. Brown and

against David K. Richards individually and David K. Richards & Company in the principal
amount of $250,000.00 for Brown's attorney fees. Since that time interest has accrued at the
contract rate of 10% per annum in the amount of $157,125.00, for a total judgment of
$407,125.00 as of February 1, 1997. Judgment interest shall continue to accrue at the contract
rate of 10% per annum on the principal amount.
9.

In addition to the trial fees awarded to Brown, judgment is hereby entered in favor

of Boyd J. Brown and against David K. Richards individually and David K. Richards &
Company for additional attorney fees, as directed by the Utah Court of Appeals, in the principal
amount of $7,879.50, together with 10% pre-judgment interest from February 5, 1995 to the
date of entry herein ($1,569.52 as of February 1, 1997), for a total judgment of $9,449.02 as
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of February 1, 1997. Judgment interest at the contract rate of 10% per annum shall accrue on
the principal balance from the date of entry herein.

n
ON THE COUNTERCLAIMS OF DAVID K. RICHARDS &
COMPANY AND DAVID K. RICHARDS INDIVIDUALLY.
1.

As to the First Claim for Relief for fraudulent misrepresentation, this Court

entered judgment against Boyd J. Brown and Interwest Aviation Corporation in the amount of
$500,000.00 together with interest from April 22, 1984 in its October 18, 1990 judgment.
Pursuant to the direction of the Utah Court of Appeals this award of $500,000.00 was applied
as a reduction of the amounts owed on the first and second half of the Asset Sale Agreement.
Accordingly, the judgment of this Court for $500,000.00 on the first Claim for Relief is hereby
satisfied.
2.

With regard to the remaining part of defendants' First Claim for Relief as to

punitive damages, the court entered judgment on October 18, 1990 in favor of David K.
Richards & Company and David K. Richards individually against Boyd J. Brown in the principal
amount of $550,000.00, together with interest through December 20, 1989, in the amount of
$36,465.75. Since December 20, 1989 additional statutory judgment interest at the rate of 12%
has accrued in the amount of $470,250.00, for a total judgment of $1,056,715.75 as of February
1, 1997. Judgment interest shall continue to accrue on the principal amount at the rate of 12%
per annum.
3.

As to the defendants' Second Claim for Relief for negligent misrepresentation,

although the jury determined that negligent misrepresentations were made, this Court determined
that the measure of compensatory damages was identical to the damages awarded defendants
6

under the First Claim for Relief and subsumed thereby. Therefore, judgment is entered in favor
of David K. Richards & Company and David K. Richards individually against Boyd J. Brown
and Interwest Aviation in the amount of $0.00.
4.

As to defendants' Third Claim for Relief of breach of warranty, the jury

determined that Boyd J. Brown and Interwest Aviation Corp. breached warranties to David K.
Richards & Company and David K. Richards individually in the sale of the Interwest business
assets and found as damages thereof the amount of $100,000.00 pursuant to the directive of the
Utah Court of Appeals, judgment is entered in favor of David K. Richards & Company and
David K. Richards individually and against Boyd J. Brown and Interwest Aviation Corp. in the
amount of $100,000.00, together with contract interest at 10% from April 24, 1984 through
February 1, 1997, in the present amount of $127,672.40 for a total judgment of $227,672.40
as of February 1, 1997. Interest shall continue to accrue at the contract interest rate of 10% per
annum on the $100,000.00 principal balance.
5.

As to defendants' Fourth Claim for Relief for breach of fiduciary duty, judgment

was entered on the jury verdict in the principal amount of $300,000.00 in favor of David K.
Richards & Company and David K. Richards individually against Boyd J. Brown in the final
judgment of October 18, 1990, together with interest through December 20, 1989 in the amount
of $19,890.41. Additional statutory judgment interest at 12% per annum has accrued from that
day through February 1, 1997 in the amount of $255,360.00. Total judgment therefore is
$575,250.41 as of February 1, 1997. Judgment interest shall continue to accrue on the principal
amount at the rate of 12% per annum.
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6.

Pursuant to the Utah Court of Appeals' opinion, the prior judgment for fees

awarded to Richards is vacated. Therefore, pursuant to this court's post-appeal findings of fact
and conclusions of law, judgment is entered in favor of David K. Richards, individually, and
David K. Richards & Company against Boyd J. Brown in the principal amounts of $218,986.42
for trial attorney fees, $80,987.28 for appellate fees and $46,901.59 for post-appeal fees, for
a total attorney fee award of $346,875.29. Accrued contract judgment interest at 10% per
annum is awarded on the trial fees from October 18, 1990 ($137,632.96 as of February 1,
1997). Pre-judgment interest of 10% per annum is awarded from February 3, 1995 on the
appeal fees and post-appeal fees to the date of entry herein ($25,250.15 as of February 1, 1997),
for a total judgment of $509,758.40 as of February 1, 1997. Judgment interest shall continue
to accrue at the contract rate of 10% on the trial fee principal. Judgment interest on the
principal appellate and post-appeal fees shall accrue at the contract rate from the date of entry
herein.
7.

Based upon the court's post-appeal findings of fact and conclusions of law,

defendants are awarded judgment against plaintiffs for costs in the amount of $235.00 filing fees,
$955.00 witness fees, and $1,835.09 appellate costs, together with pre-judgment interest of 10%
per annum from February 3, 1995 to February 1, 1997 of $605.02 for a total judgment in the
amount of $3,630.11 as of February 1, 1997. Interest will accrue on the costs from the date of
entry herein at the contract rate of 10% per annum.
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OFFSET AND STAY
1.

The amounts awarded as judgment to the plaintiffs and defendants shall constitute

an offset and the plaintiff Boyd J. Brown is awarded a net judgment against the defendants David
K. Richards individually and David K. Richards & Company in the amount of $335,248.38 as
of February 1, 1997. Any calculation of the net judgment on the date of entry herein or any
date thereafter shall be made by calculating the principal and interest due under each judgment
amount awarded herein, as of the date of calculation.
2.

All prior orders entered by the court staying execution of judgment are hereby

vacated with the entry of this judgment.
DATED this

*2(

day of

/ItiOUtA

1997.

BY THE COURT

STEPHEN t^HENROID :
Approved As To Form:

okoM2j$y^
Attorneys for Defendants
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